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A COMPARATIVE LAW LOOK AT PAIN AND
SUFFERING AWARDS
Stephen D. Sugarman*
INTRODUCTION
Most discussions of "pain and suffering" awards in American tort
law look inward, at most comparing one state with others. This Arti-
cle looks outward, exploring what other "Western" nations award in
pain and suffering damages, and comparing those outcomes with the
American practice.
As a starting point, there is a fundamental commonality. The legal
systems of Western Europe, Canada, and Australia all provide finan-
cial compensation to personal injury victims for what we in the United
States interchangeably call "pain and suffering," "noneconomic
losses," and "general damages." However labeled, this is money
meant to compensate for things like the physical pain and suffering
that goes along with a physical trauma, the emotional harm that can
come from an injury to one's self or a loved one, the disappointment
or embarrassment arising from one's changed appearance or altered
abilities to engage in pleasurable activities and favorite pastimes as a
result of an injury, the harm to one's dignity or one's health from be-
ing wrongly injured by another, and so on. These injuries are widely
acknowledged by Western democracies by ordering legally liable de-
fendants to pay money to their victims in recognition of these harms.
Despite this basic similarity among nations, the U.S. regime in most
states is enormously more generous than other legal systems in the
amounts it awards for pain and suffering. In some American states,
gravely injured plaintiffs can win millions of dollars of such damages
from their defendants. These sums are unheard of elsewhere. Indeed,
as shown below, for the same injuries, typical American awards are
often more than ten times as much as those awarded in even the most
generous of the other nations.
Some critics of the American common law of personal injury dam-
ages have long objected that the sums we award for pain and suffering
* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Thanks for research assis-
tance to Matthias Moschel, LL.M., UC Berkeley (2005).
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are inappropriately large.' In recent years, several American states
have bluntly responded by putting a cap on the amount of pain and
suffering damages that a single plaintiff obtains (e.g., $250,000).2 Usu-
ally, these caps require trial judges to wipe out any amounts that juries
award above the allowable maximum. As a result of these statutory
changes, U.S. law on pain and suffering awards now varies considera-
bly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction-at least for those with more seri-
ous injuries who are affected by these caps. Several other wealthy
nations have also put a limit on awards for pain and suffering, al-
though their solution, as explained below, is actually quite different
from ours.
Some critics of the American regime object to the uneven nature of
our awards. 3 As they see it, different juries award those with similar
injuries very different sums for reasons other than the inherent justice
of their claims. Critics point out that our juries ordinarily learn noth-
ing of what other juries previously awarded in similar cases, and so
they are probably importantly influenced by their own experience, the
talents of the lawyers in the case before them, their empathy for the
victim or dislike of the defendant, and so on. To be sure, most Ameri-
can tort claims are settled without a trial, and lawyers on both sides
are generally familiar with outcomes of prior trials and settlements.
Hence, all things equal, we would expect U.S. settlements to have less
variability than trial outcomes. Even so, practitioners with experience
bargaining in the "shadow of the law" are well aware that the amount
claimants can obtain in settlement may depend on variables such as
1. See 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 199 (1991). See generally Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV.
773 (1995); Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffer-
ing Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989); Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita James Simon, Pay-
ment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When & Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
2. A reasonably up to date list of state reforms may be found on the website of the American
Tort Reform Association (ATRA), http://www.atra.org/show/7340 (last visited Sept. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter ATRA site].
3. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 924-27 (1989); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Deter-
mine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 768-69 (1995); Shari Seidman Dia-
mond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to
Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 313-17 (1998); Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suf-
fering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement "Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303,
307-11 (1989); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments:
Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 997, 997-99 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and
Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
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whether the case would be tried in an urban or rural area of the same
state, or how the plaintiff is likely to be viewed by the jury.
I briefly explore here how several nations have been able to assure
greater consistency in their pain and suffering awards. When contrast-
ing the United States with other nations on this dimension, it should
be remembered that these days we are largely alone in relying heavily
on jury trials in personal injury cases. Yet, American states could
adapt other nations' consistency-promoting strategies to our jury-
based scheme if they wished.
Notwithstanding the success of many other countries in achieving
less internal variability in awards than we have, it should not be as-
sumed that other Western legal systems generally have similar award
levels. To the contrary, I will also show that other nations vary enor-
mously in the amounts they generally award for pain and suffering for
similar injuries. This nation-to-nation variation has nothing to do with
juries, however, and presumably arises from different national values.
In comparing the United States with other nations, it is also impor-
tant not to forget the different ways in which lawyers are compen-
sated. Outside the United States, a "loser pays" rule generally
applies.4 This means that a liable defendant pays the plaintiff's legal
expenses. American victims, by contrast, have to cover their legal ex-
penses out of their awards. Attorney fees are generally set by contract
as a percentage of the recovery, frequently thirty-three percent. Al-
though this means that the legal fee is assessed against the entire
award, I believe it is fair to assume that, as a psychological matter,
U.S. claimants understand that the burden of attorneys' fees and re-
lated costs comes first from their pain and suffering awards. And the
question for claimants is how much money, if any, is actually going to
be left for them for pain and suffering. That is, how much will they
net beyond what they are receiving for out-of-pocket losses like medi-
cal expenses and lost income?
My findings, shown below, demonstrate that, because of this differ-
ence in the payment of lawyers, those victims with relatively high
awards for out-of-pocket losses may well find themselves no longer
advantaged by the American regime of large payments nominally in-
tended for pain and suffering. Instead, American lawyers are often
the main beneficiaries.
My findings also show that the obligation in the United States to
pay one's own lawyer additionally means that the caps on pain and
4. For a comparison between the U.S. rule and the rules elsewhere, see JOHN G. FLEMING,
THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 187-234 (1988).
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suffering awards that are typically proposed and enacted in the United
States will often leave seriously injured American tort victims worse
off than their counterparts in many other wealthy nations.
II. THE EUROPEAN PICTURE
In this part, after explaining where I obtained the data upon which I
base my analysis, two broad themes are explored. The first, which I
call "vertical equity," considers the extent to which European coun-
tries similarly view the relative seriousness of various injuries. For ex-
ample, do they consistently treat losing an arm with the same gravity
ratio (for example, fifty percent as grave) relative to becoming blind?
I term the second theme a matter of "horizontal equity." There I ex-
amine the degree to which awards differ from one European nation to
another for the same sort of injury, such as losing a leg.
A. Data Sources
I have not gathered primary data about European awards for pain
and suffering. Instead, I rely upon the work of others who have ex-
plored this issue, and most importantly on Personal Injury Awards in
EU and EFTA Countries, which contains reports from experts from
twenty nations.5 This compilation, edited by David McIntosh and
Marjorie Holmes, is the third edition of the same project, the other
two having been published in 1991 and 1994. This volume generally
reports data from 2000 (although there is modest variation from na-
tion to nation).
In the McIntosh and Holmes study, expert lawyers were told to im-
agine two different tort victims who were not at all at fault in causing
their own injuries-a married male doctor, age forty, with two chil-
dren, and an unmarried female legal secretary, age twenty, with no
dependents. The experts were to then assume that the victims suf-
fered fifteen alternative injuries, ranging from instant death to repeti-
tive strain. They were then instructed to report how much money
these victims would likely recover in tort for each of the injuries. In
predicting the overall amount of recovery, the reporters were also told
to indicate separately how much of that amount would likely be
awarded for pain and suffering, and those are the numbers that I con-
centrate on here. 6
5. PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES (David McIntosh & Marjorie
Holmes eds., 2003) [hereinafter PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS].
6. A somewhat similar strategy of the hypothetical case was employed in a different compari-
son of European tort law. See COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE (Bernhard A. Koch & Helmut Koziol eds., 2003). This project did, however, generate
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I put aside the experts' reports on total compensation and its com-
ponent parts other than pain and suffering. I concede that it is possi-
ble that cross-nation comparisons of pain and suffering are flawed
because in some nations the amount awarded for pain and suffering
could depend on what is included or excluded in the other categories
of compensation. But, based upon advice I have received from Euro-
pean law scholars, I do not believe this is important for purposes of
this Article.
I also recognize (as do the study directors) that the experts' num-
bers used in the McIntosh and Holmes project might be in error. A
few of the national reports rely on a team of experts in order to arrive
at the numbers they submitted, and that may help improve the relia-
bility of the reporting. Yet, in most of the reporting nations, one per-
son alone provided the sum. As shown in Table 8, below, for most
nations, a precise figure was reported, whereas a modest range (usu-
ally less than a thirty percent range) was reported for a few of the
nations (primarily for Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands). As a
general matter, it is difficult to know whether to take more comfort in
precision. A range might reflect sensible uncertainty, or perhaps a
keen awareness of variation among similar cases (perhaps from place
to place around the country or perhaps in other ways). A single num-
ber might convey a false precision.
In any event, the reliability of the national reports is likely to de-
pend on other differences among the countries. In Germany, for ex-
ample, there are very good compilations of primary data on personal
injury awards for all sorts of different harms. 7 Hence, to the extent
that the hypothetical injuries in the study parallel injury types con-
tained in these compilations, the German reporters would be expected
to be quite confident about their replies. In nations without such com-
pilations, the task of the expert in providing a reliable report would be
harder.
Indeed, in connection with the first version of this project, the ex-
perts from Italy pressed the study directors to provide a number re-
flecting the percent disabled they should assign to each of the injuries
that they were to convert into predicted damage awards, and the di-
rectors complied. The directors based the percentages on how they
the sort of detailed information by which comparisons can be made of the sort presented here.
For an earlier effort to compare European awards using several hypothetical cases, see PAUL
SZOLLOSY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN EUROPE (1992); Paul Sz6llosy, Recent
Trends in the Standard of Compensation for Personal Injury in a European Context, 3 NORDISK
FORSIKRINGSTIDSSKR!Fr 191 (1991).
7. See, e.g., ALLGEMEINER DEUTSCHER AUTOMOBIL-CLUB (ADAC), SCHMERZENSGELD-BE-
TRA E (Susanne Hacks et al. eds., 17th ed. 2001) [hereinafter ADAC].
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believed the English Department of Social Services would rate each
disability in connection with the award of workers' compensation ben-
efits (although the directors also instructed reporters to base their es-
timates on different percentages if other numbers were used in their
own nation). 8
And finally, because of the way the Spanish data is reported, clearly
separate sums for noneconomic loss are not readily identifiable, and
hence in this Article I have ignored the Spanish data and include re-
sults from only nineteen of the twenty nations in the McIntosh and
Holmes project.
As I have explained, the McIntosh and Holmes study on which I
primarily rely is based on expert predictions about hypothetical cases.
As a check on their reliability, I have compared these predictions
against some results in actual cases, relying for that purpose, among
other things, on two other helpful volumes.9 Based on those compari-
sons, I have concluded that the McIntosh and Holmes expert valua-
tions are reasonably reliable. McIntosh and Holmes have also done
some cross-checking and, while they realize that individual results in
real cases are likely to vary from the numbers they provide, they too
are reasonably confident that their study reports broadly accurate esti-
mates. 10 I should also add that it appears that the McIntosh and
Holmes experts saw it as their job to report how much the hypotheti-
cal victims would obtain in court, rather than in settlement, although,
based on informal conversations with European lawyers, I have a
sense that the settlement discount is much less there than in the
United States.
Moreover, for my purposes, even fairly large errors in the numbers
reported by McIntosh and Holmes are not terribly important because
my attention is primarily on gross differences, both among the report-
ing nations and as between them and the United States. Before dis-
cussing the results of the McIntosh and Holmes project, I should make
clear that this effort says nothing about the frequency of litigation for
similar accidents and similar harms from nation to nation." Nor do I
8. PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS, supra note 5, at 2.
9. See DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (W.V. Horton
Rogers ed., 2001); THE JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GEN-
ERAL DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (6th ed. 2002 & 7th ed. 2004) (reporting detailed
results for specific injuries from England and Wales).
10. See PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS, supra note 5, at 3.
11. For a general discussion of lawsuit frequency from country to country, see Erhard Blank-
enburg, Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES
41 (David Nelken ed., 1997). For more general information comparing the personal injury law
schemes throughout Europe (and elsewhere), see INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL INJURY COMPEN-
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directly concern myself with the availability of alternative compensa-
tion schemes in the countries, the existence of which could be an im-
portant factor in litigation rates.
B. Results
My analysis focuses on six of the fifteen hypothetical injuries cov-
ered in the McIntosh and Holmes survey: quadriplegia, total blind-
ness, deafness, amputation of an arm above the elbow, amputation of
a leg above the knee, and facial burns. Intuitively, these seemed to
reflect a diverse range of reasonably distinct harms. To be sure, the
actual pain and suffering of any individual could easily vary because of
the imprecision of the descriptions used in the study. For example,
was the amputated arm the person's writing arm? Precisely how bad
were the facial burns? Had the person who lost a leg been an avid
skier? Nonetheless, as already noted, for the most part, the expert
reporters had little trouble specifying a single sum as the amount
likely to be awarded in their country for pain and suffering for each of
the hypothetical injuries.
1. Basic Data
TABLE 1
PREDICTED AWARDS FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE MEDIAN
NATION BY TYPE OF INJURY AMONG NINETEEN
EUROPEAN NATIONS (C1000S)
Quadriplegia 92
Blindness 65
Leg Amputation 41
Arm Amputation 38
Deafness 31
Facial Burns 14
Table 1 shows the predicted median award (in euros) for pain and
suffering for the hypothetical doctor suffering each of the six injuries I
explore (i.e., the nation whose predicted award for that injury ranked
tenth among the nineteen examined here). For example, what might
be termed the "typical" European pain and suffering award is
C38,000 for the loss of an arm, C65,000 for blindness, and so on.
Shortly, I will present the range of these awards for the nineteen na-
tions and then compare them with U.S. data. This section presents
some data relevant to the question of whether there is general agree-
SATION (Dennis Campbell ed., 1996); PERSONAL INJURY COMPENSATION IN EUROPE (Marco
Bona & Philip Mead eds., 2003).
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ment among European nations (as reflected by the expert reports) as
to the relative seriousness of these six injuries.
2. Relative Seriousness of the Various Injuries ("Vertical Equity"
Within Europe)
Do the nineteen reporting nations broadly agree on which injuries
deserve more money for pain and suffering and which deserve less?
And, if so, do they broadly agree as to what should be the relative size
of the awards for each of these harms? This inquiry can be viewed as a
matter of "vertical equity."
I calculated a "relative-seriousness" rating for the six injuries for
each nation by determining what percentage each predicted award
amount is of the largest predicted award for that nation. (Where a
range of predicted recovery was supplied, I used the middle of the
range.) Table 2 displays the results for the nineteen countries for the
injured doctor case. This table allows the viewer to see not only the
ordering of the injuries for each nation, but also the range between
the injuries in each nation.
TABLE 2
NATIONAL AWARD PROPORTION FOR EACH INJURY AS A
PERCENTAGE OF HIGHEST PREDICTED FOR EACH NATION
Facial Arm Leg
Burn Deaf Loss Loss Blindness Quadriplegia
Austria 11 30 34 44 46 100
Belgium 23 58 54 56 73 100
Denmark 21 59 59 59 100 72
England 37 32 37 37 70 100
Finland 18 52 58 41 100 100
France 8 31 58 41 100 100
Germany 13 13 13 15 25 100
Greece 29 35 47 47 100 100
Iceland 21 42 53 44 100 100
Ireland 32 39 67 67 94 100
Italy 8 52 20 20 90 100
Liechtenstein 14 30 34 45 46 100
Luxembourg 26 100 41 51 96 85
Netherlands 12 29 32 37 58 100
Norway 11 40 28 28 100 100
Portugal 10 70 60 60 90 100
Scotland 19 14 42 42 77 100
Sweden 7 44 44 32 88 100
Switzerland 10 65 50 50 99 100
Table 2 indicates that in most countries, quadriplegia and blindness
are considered most serious and facial burns as least serious. Report-
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ers for twelve countries predicted the highest pain and suffering award
for quadriplegia, one predicted the highest pain and suffering award
for blindness, and five predicted essentially equal awards for both.
(One reporter ranked deafness ahead of both blindness and
quadriplegia.) At the other end, seventeen of the nineteen national
reports predicted the lowest pain and suffering award for facial burns.
Among the other three injuries-deafness, loss of an arm, and loss of
a leg-there was no clear rank ordering. Overall, it seems fair to say
that all three of those injuries were treated as likely to attract roughly
the same awards by most reporters, although the data provided by the
reporters is least consistent with respect to deafness.
In comparing the predicted awards of the secretary with those pre-
dicted for the doctor, I found that in six of the countries there was
little or no difference in the sums, regardless of the injury.' 2 In eight
of the countries, the awards predicted for the secretary were modestly
higher for most or all injuries. I will assume that, in these nations, age
is taken into account in determining the amount of pain and suffering
and the extra sum for the secretary basically reflects that she is fifteen
years younger in the hypothetical and so has more years ahead of her
to live with her disability.
The differences between the predicted awards for the doctor and
the secretary are harder to understand for the remaining countries. In
Belgium, for example, the secretary was predicted to receive more
than the doctor only for facial burns. Perhaps this discrepancy reflects
an assumption that, as a young, unmarried woman, this disfigurement
was seen as more painful to her than to him, even when blindness
would not be. More difficult to understand is the report from Switzer-
land, for example, where both deafness and facial burns were pre-
dicted to yield higher pain and suffering awards to the secretary, even
though loss of limbs, blindness, and quadriplegia were not. Given
what are relatively modest differences in predicted outcomes for both
victims, the data I present here is drawn only from the numbers pre-
dicted for the doctor case.
TABLE 3
EUROPEAN "VERTICAL EQUITY": MEDIAN NATION AWARD
PROPORTIONS (%) (FROM TABLE 2)
Quadriplegia 100 Arm 44
Blindness 90 Deafness 40
Leg 44 Facial Burns 14
12. The data for the secretary is not shown here, but is available from the author.
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Drawing on the data from Table 2, Table 3 presents the median na-
tion's percentage for each of the six injuries. To be clear, Table 3
shows that the median nation-the. one with the tenth highest propor-
tion of the nineteen reporting-was expected to award forty-four per-
cent as much in pain and suffering for a leg amputation as compared
with what the median was expected to award for whatever it viewed as
the most serious injury of the six. Hence, Table 3 presents a rough,
comparative measure of the European-wide average seriousness of
the six injuries.
TABLE 4
EUROPEAN "VERTICAL EQUITY": PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY
PERCENTAGES PROVIDED BY THE STUDY DIRECTORS
Quadriplegia 100
Blindness 100
Deafness 50
Leg Amputation 35
Arm Amputation 30
Facial Burns Up to 20
Recall, at the request of the Italian team, the study directors previ-
ously provided percent-disabled figures for each of the hypothetical
injuries. Table 4 presents those numbers. Comparing them with the
numbers calculated and presented in Table 3, one sees a reasonably
close fit between the median nation data and the study director's esti-
mates of percent-disabled. (To be sure, for some reporters, the study
directors' percent-disabled message may have been too influential,
thereby contributing to a similarity between the rankings on the two
tables.)
TABLE 5
EUROPEAN "VERTICAL EQUITY": RANGE OF AWARD
PROPORTIONS (%) FOR FIFTEEN (OF NINETEEN)
MIDDLE-RANKING NATIONS
Quadriplegia 85-100
Blindness 46-100
Deafness 29-65
Leg 28-60
Arm 28-59
Bums 10-26
Averages can be deceiving. Table 5 draws together data from Table
2 by showing a restricted range of the percentages calculated for each
injury. For this illustration, I have eliminated the two nations at both
extremes. But even for the middle fifteen nations, Table 5 shows a
[Vol. 55:399
2006] A LOOK AT PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS 409
range of percentages of at least a two-to-one ratio for the five injuries
generally rated less serious than quadriplegia.
To illustrate this point with a few examples (drawn from Table 2),
the Netherlands reporter predicts an award for deafness at twenty-
nine percent of the award in the Netherlands for quadriplegia,
whereas in Switzerland the deafness award is sixty-five percent of
quadriplegia. In the same vein, the predicted arm loss award in Nor-
way is twenty-eight percent of the quadriplegia award, whereas in
Denmark it is fifty-nine percent. Moving to blindness, the pain and
suffering award in Austria is predicted to be only forty-six percent of
the quadriplegia award, whereas in several nations it is equal to the
quadriplegia award.
In short, looked at in this latter way, I see considerable variation
from country to country in its assessment of the relative seriousness of
the six injuries.
3. Awards From Country to Country ("Horizontal Equity" Within
Europe)
"Horizontal equity" refers to the extent to which victims with the
same injuries are awarded the same sums for pain and suffering. The
nineteen-nation survey provides little useful information on this ques-
tion with respect to intra-national differences. As noted, most report-
ers offer a single sum for each injury, and only a few provide a range.
Moreover, as earlier suggested, those providing a range of recovery
may well be saying only that there are different sorts of cases captured
by these broad injury titles. Greater attention will be given below to
intra-national consistency. 13
But these nineteen-nation reports do permit the examination of
horizontal equity by making inter-national comparisons across nations
for the same injury. Of course, there may be quite understandable
reasons why different nations would award different sums for the ex-
act same injury, reflecting different values that different legal systems
seek to advance with pain and suffering awards. Nonetheless, in pre-
paring to make a comparison with the United States, this inquiry al-
lows us to consider how uniformly Europeans approach the issue.
13. Professor Giovanni Comand6 elsewhere reports that, within Italy, different jurisdictions
assign different multipliers to what are in effect the same tables, thereby awarding different sums
for pain and suffering for the same injury based on the location of the trial. Giovanni Comandd,
Non-Pecuniary Damages for Personal Injury in Europe and the U.S.A.: A Proposal for Judicial
Scheduling Models (unpublished article, on file with author).
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TABLE 6
NATIONAL RANKINGS (ONE TO NINETEEN) BY AMOUNT OF AWARD
BY INJURY AND OVERALL AVERAGE
Burns Deaf Arm Leg Blind Quad Average
Ireland 1 4 1 1 1 1 1.5
England 2 5 3 3 3 3 3
Belgium 3 3 2 2 5 6 3.5
Italy 7 2 7 10 2 4 5
Luxembourg 6 1 5 5 6 9 5
Scotland 4 17 3 3 4 5 6
Germany 5 9 12 11 10 2 8
Netherlands 10 7 9 8 9 7 8
Liechtenstein 8 8 8 7 13 8 9
Iceland 9 12 10 12 8 13 11
Austria 12 15 11 9 15 10 12
Finland 11 10 13 14 11 14 12
France 15 14 6 6 18 11 13
Switzerland 17 6 14 13 12 16 13
Norway 13 13 18 16 7 12 13
Portugal 18 11 15 17 16 17 16
Denmark 14 18 17 15 17 18 17
Sweden 19 16 16 18 14 15 17
Greece 16 19 19 19 19 19 19
Before turning to the detailed monetary figures that the reporters
predicted would be awarded for various injuries under their nation's
legal system, Table 6 presents the relative rank of each nation in terms
of how much money its reporter predicts would be provided in pain
and suffering damages to the hypothetical doctor for each of the six
injuries. For example, a "six" under burns means that the amount of
this nation's pain and suffering award for burns was the sixth highest
of the nineteen, whereas a "thirteen" under burns means that this na-
tion's award for burns was thirteenth highest.
Not surprisingly, no nation shows exactly the same rank for all inju-
ries. Nonetheless, some patterns emerge. Looking at both their aver-
age rank and their individual scores, it appears that all but one of the
nineteen nations falls reasonably easily into one of four subgroups.
Six "Group One" nations-Ireland, England, Scotland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Italy-represent the most generous countries in
terms of pain and suffering awards. Nearly all of their comparative
numbers are seven or less. At the other end, four "Group Four" na-
tions-Greece, Portugal, Sweden, and Denmark-represent the least
generous countries. Nearly all of their comparative numbers are four-
teen or more.
Five "Group Three" nations-Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Aus-
tria, and Norway-have reasonably similar numbers that put this
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group somewhat above the least generous group. Three "Group Two"
nations-Germany, Netherlands, and Liechtenstein-appear clus-
tered somewhat below Group One in terms of generosity. France,
with such varied numbers shown in Table 6, resists categorization.
Although I will not make too much of it here, there are national
characteristics (or some might say, stereotypes) that one might associ-
ate with these groups. At the least generous end (Groups Three and
Four) we find that:
* two relatively poor nations among the nineteen (Greece
and Portugal) perhaps simply cannot afford the more
generous awards paid elsewhere in Europe;14
* five Scandinavian nations (Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Iceland, and Finland) are well known for having strong
social welfare programs, and that may cause these coun-
tries to favor putting national resources into their more
collective schemes instead of individualized tort law re-
coveries; and 15
" two Germanic nations (Switzerland and Austria), whose
citizens I think of as being relatively "tough," might
translate that characteristic into relatively lower mone-
tary awards.
At the more generous end (Groups One and Two) we find that:
* three common-law nations (England, Scotland, and Ire-
land) not only have a historic tradition of jury-based
awards that may influence today's award levels, but also
the common-law experience might translate into a more
individualized sense of corrective justice; and
" four highly Catholic states (Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Italy-plus Ireland, as well) are relatively more generous
for reasons that are not at all clear to me-although one
European colleague suggested to me that it is possible
that Catholics may pity victims more than Protestants
who may be more stoic.
14. See World Bank Group, http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/economic/
gnp/dataeuro.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (revealing that Greece and Portugal have a fairly
low gross national product (GNP) per capita ($11,740 and $10,670 respectively), while other
countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria each have a GNP of $26,570, $39,980 and
$26,830 respectively).
15. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2005), available at www.bartleby.com/65/so/
socwelf/html (indicating that "[niot all governments have equally extensive social welfare sys-
tems. Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, often termed 'welfare states,' have wide-
ranging social welfare legislation").
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TABLE 7
EUROPEAN "HORIZONTAL EQUITY" AMONG THE NINETEEN
NATIONS, MEDIAN NATION AND RANGE OF NATIONAL AWARDS
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING BY TYPE OF INJURY (IN 1000s)
Median Range
Quadriplegia 92 15-250
Blindness 65 22-235
Leg Amputation 41 10-166
Arm Amputation 38 10-166
Deafness 31 7-124
Facial Burns 14 4-80
Turning now to actual monetary figures, Table 7 shows the full
range of predicted pain and suffering awards for each of the six inju-
ries for the nineteen reporting nations. The extremes of the range are
very substantial. Notice that for each of the six harms, the most gen-
erous system is predicted to award more than ten times what is paid by
the least generous system. Table 7 also repeats the data from Table 1,
showing the award for each injury for the median nation. Those data
reveal that the extremes vary substantially in both directions from
what I am terming the typical award.
For those wishing to see the fuller data set, I present in Table 8
detailed monetary figures for each nation for each assumed injury in
the doctor's case.
TABLE 8
NINETEEN-NATION DATA: PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS
BY TYPE OF INJURY (IN EUROS)
Burns Amputation arm Amputation leg Total
(face) Deafness (above elbow) (above knee) Blindness Quadriplegia
Austria 6980-12692 27286 31729 41247 41882 92013
Belgium 41206 101400 94827 98839 128128 175217
Denmark 7971 22037 22037 22037 37100 18521-34932
England/Wales 79750 68875 79750 79750 152250 217500
Finland 10689 31004 29400 24586 59881 59881
France 7324 27296 50596 59917 29958 86548
Germany 22308-44615 31230-33462 26770-35692 33462-40153 58000-71385 178462-312308
Greece 5124-7688 7688 10250 10250 21780 15374
Iceland 14992 29983 37978 31983 71961 71961
Ireland 66483-94083 83085-110687 166031 166031 221374-249046 221374-276718
Italy 15785-15883 104877 40899 40899 178805 199671
Liechtenstein 15699 33751 39246 51018 51804 113812
Luxembourg 32437 124986 50894 63403 120749 106233
Netherlands 13866 29713-39617 29713-47541 39617-49522 59427-79235 19235-158471
Norway 8135 29022 20897 20897 73126 73126
Portugal 4356 30489 26132 26132 39199 43555
Scotland 36250 26100 79750 79750 130500 188500
Sweden 1241-6634 26536 25967 19144 51366 58758
Switzerland 5732 37252 28656 28656 57313 57313
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C. European Conclusion
Based on the data reported here, these nineteen European nations
tend to rank fairly similarly the "relative-seriousness" of the six inju-
ries. Nonetheless, there are some noticeable differences in national
perceptions of relative-seriousness of the six injuries. But this modest
amount of vertical inequity is dwarfed by a much higher level of hori-
zontal inequity. Simply put, European nations are predicted to award
vastly different amounts for pain and suffering damages to victims
with the same injury. While the cause of these differences exceeds the
scope of this article, it is at least clear that the legal awards for pain
and suffering across Europe are enormously varied from country to
country.
III. THE U.S. PICTURE
This section presents American data on pain and suffering awards
to victims who suffered broadly similar injuries to the six injuries dis-
cussed in Section II.
A. Data Sources
The American data is from the results of both actual trials and set-
tlements (although, so far as we could tell, none of the reported re-
sults was reduced in amount because of a statutory cap on pain and
suffering awards). These data come primarily from James P. Munger,
What's It Worth: A Guide to Current Personal Injury Awards and Set-
tlements, and Jacob A. Stein, Stein on Personal Injury Damages.16
There are good reasons not to treat these data as precisely capturing
typical American awards. On the other hand, there are good reasons
to view them as being roughly in the ballpark in terms of what Ameri-
can tort victims with these sorts of injuries might expect to recover.
It is important to remember that a victim will often suffer multiple
injuries, and we have sought to exclude those cases. Thus, as best we
can determine, the U.S. outcomes here reflect awards for victims with
a single basic harm. Most of the American data we draw on here in-
cludes information on both the amount of pain and suffering damages
awarded and the total amount awarded, although there are some in-
complete reports.
Nonetheless, I appreciate that the cases we found are neither a
complete nor random sample of all the cases in which victims recov-
16. See JAMES P. MUNGER, WHAT'S IT WORTH: A GUIDE TO CURRENT PERSONAL INJURY
AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS (2004); JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES
(3d ed. 2003).
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ered at trial for the harms we examined. Hence, there is reason to be
concerned that the data sources we relied upon exaggerate recovery
levels because they may not include a representative share of the cases
in which a lower recovery was obtained. It is also fair to assume that
settled cases (which are most cases, after all) on average result in
lower recovery than tried cases, and I would be willing to assume a
discount of one-third.
Still, as will become clear in the analysis, it would appear that all of
my basic points would follow even were the numbers reported here
twice as much as (or even more than) the typical results in the real
world.
B. Pain and Suffering Awards for Broadly Similar Injuries to Those
in the European Study
1. Quadriplegia
Research revealed seventeen reported awards in quadriplegia cases
from a wide range of U.S. jurisdictions from the years 1986-2003, with
most of the cases coming from years fairly close to 2000. Of these, the
pain and suffering portion has been separately identified in twelve of
them.
TABLE 9
U.S. "HORIZONTAL EQUITY": PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS IN
TWELVE QUADRIPLEGIA CASES (IN $ MILLIONS)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.4
Median
3.5
4.0
4.6
4.9
6.0
6.0
As shown on Table 9, the median pain and suffering award was just
under $3.5 million. As the awards ranged from one million to six mil-
lion dollars, the highest award was six times that of the lowest
award. 17
17. The level of these U.S. quadriplegia awards does not generally decrease with age (data on
file with the author). Indeed, the average award for those ages twenty to thirty is slightly higher
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2. Leg Amputation
We identified twenty-six U.S. leg amputation cases from 1983
through 2003 (again with most of the cases coming from years fairly
close to 2000), and we have separate amounts for the pain and suffer-
ing awards in seventeen of them. Of these, only four involved ampu-
tation of one leg above the knee-the facts of the European
hypothetical discussed earlier.
TABLE 10
U.S. "HORIZONTAL EouiTy": PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS IN
SEVENTEEN LEG AMPUTATION CASES (IN $ MILLIONS)
* Above the Knee: 0.400, 4.000, 5.600, 7.500
* Both Legs: 0.1500, 6.000
* One Leg Below the Knee: 0.150, 0.200, 0.400, 0.490, 0.500, 0.615, 1.000, 1.550,
1.750, 5.580, 9.750
The results for all seventeen cases are shown in Table 10. For the
four above-the-knee amputation cases, the range of the pain and suf-
fering awards was huge. Two cases involved loss of both legs and the
pain and suffering awards in those cases were also radically different.
Most of the cases we uncovered involved an amputation at or below
the knee of one leg. These awards also varied enormously, with the
largest recovery more than sixty times that of the smallest. The me-
dian of all seventeen of the awards for pain and suffering was one
million dollars. 18
3. Blindness
TABLE 11
U.S. "HORIZONTAL EQUITY": PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS IN
ELEVEN BLINDNESS CASES (IN $ MILLIONS)
" Both eyes: 4.400, 4.500, 5.000
" One eye: 0.245, 0.300, 0.500, 0.500, 0.800, 1.500, 5.600
We identified only six reasonably recent U.S. cases of total blind-
ness, and the awards separated pain and suffering for only three of
them. Table 11 shows that in those cases, amounts of $4.4 million, $4.5
million, and $5.0 million were awarded for pain and suffering.
than the average award for those under age twenty. In general, there is little variation on aver-
age by decade of life.
18. Unlike the case of quadriplegia, for the leg amputation cases there is a reasonably strong
connection with age (data on file with the author). The highest of the five awards made to those
over fifty was $615,000, whereas all seven of the awards over one million dollars, where we know
the age, were made to those under age fifty.
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Thirteen fairly recent U.S. cases were identified in which one eye
was blinded and, of these, pain and suffering awards were separated
out in eight. For those eight cases, as shown in Table 11, pain and
suffering awards ranged from $245,000 to $5,600,000, a ratio of more
than twenty to one.
4. Arm and Finger Loss
TABLE 12
U.S. "HORIZONTAL EQUITY": PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS
(IN $1000S)
Seven Finger-Loss Cases (P&S in $1000s) 20, 50, 100, 137, 400, 569, 850
Five Arm-Loss Cases (P&S in $1000s) 700, 1470, 1500, 2454 (various types)
To provide something of a contrast with lost arm cases, we identi-
fied eight recent U.S. cases of a lost finger, with pain and suffering
awards separated out for seven of them. As shown in Table 12, those
seven awards ranged from $20,000 to $850,000 with a median of
$137,000.
We also identified five arm amputation cases (see Table 12), two
below the elbow and one involving the loss of both arms. Because of
the low numbers of cases and their variety, perhaps not much should
be made of these awards, although the median pain and suffering
award for them was $1,500,000.
5. Vertical Equity in the United States
Because of the limited data, I am reluctant to draw too strong con-
clusions about comparing the relative ranking of the injuries examined
in the United States with the European picture. Let me simply report
that (as shown in the prior tables) the median awards for quadriplegia,
loss of an arm (all types), loss of a leg (all types), and loss of a finger,
were $3.5 million, $1.5 million, $1 million, and $137,000, respectively.
The very few total blindness cases averaged $4.5 million (with
$500,000 as the median award for the loss of one eye). Generally
speaking, then, the median awards for quadriplegia, leg loss, and arm
loss in the United States suggest a congruence with European awards,
as described above, in terms of their relative seriousness. With respect
to total blindness, just as a few European nations treated it as or more
serious than quadriplegia, the limited U.S. data suggests something of
the same thing here.
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6. Ratio of High Versus Low American Awards for Types of Loss
TABLE 13
U.S. "HORIZONTAL EQUITY": U.S. RATIOS OF FULL RANGE OF
PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS BY TYPE OF INJURY
Finger 42/1
Arm 3.5/1
One Eye 23/1
Leg 65/1
Quadriplegia 6/1
Table 13 presents the ratio of the high and low awards identified for
the various injuries on which we are focusing in the U.S. data. What
these numbers show is that, like variations in awards from European
nation to nation, American awards can vary enormously from case to
case. I want particularly to emphasize that we found ratios of more
than twenty to one for several of the injuries.
Because state law caps do not appear to have been involved in these
cases, it is not likely the case that the formal common law of damages
varied importantly from state to state for these cases. Therefore,
judges probably give roughly similar jury instructions on pain and suf-
fering awards in most places. Still, variations in results from case to
case could be the product of evidentiary and other rules that differ
from place to place as to what lawyers are permitted to argue (for
example in their closing arguments) and introduce as evidence (such
as to what the daily life of the victim is now like). I believe it is more
likely, however, that these widely varying results are more importantly
a reflection of what I noted at the start-the American regime of pain
and suffering awards makes no use of precedent, and so the amount
awarded in each case typically reflects what a single jury concluded
would be fair from everything it learned and considered on this
occasion.
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IV. AMERICAN-EUROPEAN COMPARISONS
TABLE 14
CROSS-NATIONAL AWARD SIZE COMPARISON COMPARING U.S.
MEDIAN PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS WITH EUROPEAN AWARDS
U.S. Medians in European
U.S. Medians in C1000s Medians European
$1000s (approx.) l1000s Range C1000s
Finger 137 100 - -
Arm - - 38 10-166
Leg 1000 750 41 10-166
One Eye 500 375 - -
Blindness 4500 3375 65 22-235
Quadriplegia 3400 2550 92 15-250
(Cl = $1.333)
Having provided separate data as to award levels for the different
legal systems, this section turns to American-European comparisons.
Drawing on the prior tables, Table 14 first displays median U.S. pain
and suffering awards in both dollars and euros for the type of injuries
examined. 19 Then, Table 14 displays what I earlier termed the typical
European nation award, plus the full range of predicted European na-
tion awards.
The most important point these numbers show is that the amounts
awarded for pain and suffering in the American cases we examined
are vastly greater than the predicted awards in Europe. This is true
when looking at averages as well as the full range of European
awards. Indeed, these data show that the U.S. median awards are
enormously larger than the highest predicted awards for similar inju-
ries in Europe, notwithstanding the great diversity of award levels
throughout Europe.
More specifically, the median pain and suffering award in the
United States for quadriplegia was more than twenty-five times
greater than the predicted award for quadriplegia in the median Euro-
pean nation and more than ten times the highest predicted European
award.
For loss of a leg, the'median American award, even taking into ac-
count a wider range of leg injuries including the perhaps lesser injury
of a loss below the knee, was nearly twenty times the predicted award
19. 1 converted dollars to euros at the rate of $1.333 per euro. This is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary, since the euro's value against the dollar has been quite volatile in the past few years,
amounting to $1.22 per euro at the time this is written. The U.S. case reports are possibly, on
average, somewhat newer than the European data, suggesting that taking account of a year or
two of European inflation might be warranted. On balance, the figure appears to be sensible.
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in the median European nation, and more than four times the highest
predicted award. Indeed, the loss of a finger in the United States
tends to generate almost three times the median European nation
pain and suffering award for loss of an arm.
Loss of one eye in the United States tends to attract more for pain
and suffering than does total blindness in Europe.
V. TAKING LEGAL EXPENSES INTO ACCOUNT
From the data presented so far, it appears as though the United
States is far more lavish than Europe when awarding pain and suffer-
ing damages. As noted at the outset, however, one must remember
that, in Europe, losers in torts cases pay the legal fees and costs of
winners. Therefore, the European pain and suffering awards represent
what the victims (approximately) keep.
In the United States, by contrast, each side pays its own expenses.
For purposes of this exercise, I am going to reduce the American
plaintiff's total award by thirty-three percent to account for attorneys'
fees and expenses. I view this as a conservative estimate. This is be-
cause, apart from special cases (e.g., those involving minors), it would
be rare for the lawyer's fee itself to be less than thirty-three percent in
a case that actually goes to trial (and often it would be forty percent).
Moreover, litigation costs are typically increased by the ordinarily
substantial out-of-pocket expenses of litigation for expert witnesses,
depositions, investigations, and the like. On the other hand, I concede
that cases that are settled relatively quickly typically require consider-
ably fewer expenses and generally involve a lower fee for the success-
ful lawyer (say, twenty-five percent).
As I explained earlier, fees and costs in the United States are not
assessed against any specific portion of the recovery, but against the
total recovery. Nonetheless, it seems sensible to assume that the fees
and costs are best understood by the victim as coming (first) out of the
pain and suffering award. After all, if the victim pays the fees and
costs out of the portion of the recovery that is based on lost income or
medical expenses, then those economic losses will not be fully com-
pensated (although admittedly, in the United States, a substantial
share of the economic loss awarded in cases of serious harm is likely
to be based on often uncertain projections as to future medical ex-
penses and wage losses).
Once the matter of legal expenses is taken into account, American-
European comparisons become more complicated to make. This is
because the net position of American victims is strongly influenced by
the relative share of the total award that is meant for pain and suffer-
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ing. This is made especially vivid when comparing leg amputations
with quadriplegia.
TABLE 15
WHAT Is LEFr FOR VICTIM PAIN AND SUFFERING AFTER TAKING
LEGAL FEES INTO ACCOUNT: U.S. LEG AMPUTATION AWARDS
P&S Amount
($1000s)
150
200
150
400
452
490
500
615
1000
1550
1750
4000
5580
5600
6000
7500
9750
Total Award
($1OOOs)
500
1442
400
435
633
573
734
716
1500
2420
4493
7568
6343
7670
7497
7510
11426
P&S % of
Total
30
14
38
92
71
86
68
86
67
64
39
53
88
73
80
100
85
P&S left
(minus 33% for
legal expenses)
($1000s)
(20)
(280)
20
250
240
300
260
380
500
740
250
1480
1890
3040
3500
5000
5940
For the seventeen leg amputation cases (of all types) presented ear-
lier, there is data available on both the total amount of the award and
the share of that awarded for pain and suffering. These data (in dol-
lars) are shown in the first two columns of Table 15. The third column
shows what share (percentage) of the total award was for pain and
suffering, and one can see that it was more than sixty percent of the
award in thirteen of the seventeen cases, and more than thirty-three
percent in all but two cases. The upshot is that, in all but those two
cases, the U.S. victim winds up with some money left for pain and
suffering after paying assumed legal expenses of thirty-three percent
out of the pain and suffering award. Indeed, as the fourth column of
Table 15 shows, fourteen of the seventeen victims are assumed to wind
up with fairly substantial amounts for pain and suffering, ranging from
$240,000 to nearly six million dollars. '
Column five then converts these n6t numbers to euros. Notice how
much larger many of these numbers are than is the median European
award (C41,000) or even the European maximum (C166,000) pre-
dicted for leg amputations above the knee.
P&S left
(Caooos)
(15)
(210)
15
190
180
225
195
285
375
555
190
1110
1420
2280
2625
3750
4460
420 [Vol. 55:399
2006] A LOOK AT PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS 421
On the other hand, looking more carefully at the data, note that
three of the seventeen are actually worse off than they would be in the
most generous European nation, seven are near or modestly above
the European high end, and only seven are well beyond the European
maximum, six of which are dramatically so. In sum, even taking legal
expenses into account as done here, American leg amputation victims
typically net at least as much for pain and suffering, and often enor-
mously more, than everywhere in Europe.
Although not fully discussed in this Article, the cases found for
blindness (whether in one or both eyes) and for amputation of a finger
or an arm generally suggest a similar pattern.20 That is, even after
reducing awards for legal expenses, U.S. victims in these types of cases
tend to have more-often enormously more-money left for pain and
suffering than those who lose their sight or their arm in Europe.
By contrast, however, the pattern in the quadriplegia cases is very
different as shown by Table 16.
TABLE 16
WHAT Is LEFT FOR VICTIM PAIN AND SUFFERING AFTER TAKING
LEGAL FEES INTO ACCOUNT: U.S. QUADRIPLEGIA AWARDS
P&S left
(minus 33% for
P&S Amount Total Award P&S % of legal expenses) P&S left
($1000s) ($1000s) Total ($1000s) (C1000s)
1,000 3,950 25 (320) (240)
1,500 19,100 8 (5370) (4025)
2,000 7,345 27 (450) (340)
2,500 7,872 32 (125) (95)
3,000 8,972 33 10 10
3,400 6,670 51 1180 885
3,500 8,187 43 770 580
4,000 17,770 22 (1920) (1440)
4,600 21,360 22 (2520) (1890)
4,900 9,500 52 1730 1300
6,000 9,000 67 3000 2250
6,000 16,530 36 490 370
Patterned after the prior table on leg loss, Table 16 demonstrates
that because the share of the award intended for pain and suffering is
often smaller than thirty-three percent, many of the victims face legal
expenses in excess (and often substantially in excess) of the amount
awarded for pain and suffering. As revealed in column five, after pay-
ing their presumed legal expenses, seven of the twelve victims would
20. Data on file with author.
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be worse off in the United States than in the typical European nation,
where C92,000 was the predicted pain and suffering award. Most
strikingly, three American victims have more than a million euros def-
icit in pain and suffering and would have to surrender a significant
share of their award for out-of-pocket losses to their lawyer. On the
other hand, because of the variability in the U.S. data, two victims still
wind up with more than a million euros for pain and suffering even
after paying legal expenses, and therefore would still be financially far
better off than in even the most generous European nation
(C250,000).
The data shows that in the quadriplegia cases, although the total
awards tend to be higher than in the leg loss cases, the typical share of
the total award for pain and suffering is relatively much smaller. I
assume that the reason for this is that the quadriplegia cases tend to
involve high levels of both ongoing care and lost income. Notice that
this analysis assumes that on the out-of-pocket loss side, both Ameri-
can and European law, one way or another, basically provide full com-
pensation; I am not confident that this is a very reliable assumption,
but I could not see what else to do given the data I have.
Despite the initial appearances that come from looking at the gross
amount of the awards for pain and suffering, American victims need
to have pain and suffering awards of, perhaps, at least half or more of
their total award in order to meet or exceed the more generous Euro-
pean nations in terms of pain and suffering compensation. And while
we see that this frequently occurs for grave injuries like the loss of leg
that may carry with them relatively moderate medical costs and in-
come loss, that pattern may not follow for severe disabilities with very
large, ongoing medical and related expenses.21 Simply put, even gen-
erous American juries seem unwilling to consistently award the neces-
sary seven- or eight-figure amount for pain and suffering.
VI. LESSONS FROM ENGLAND AND COMMONWEALTH NATIONS
Although England (and Wales), Canada, and Australia remain
largely common-law nations as to the substance of tort law (Quebec
aside), they treat pain and suffering damages quite differently than
21. Overall, recovery for paih and suffering in the United States is generally thought to
amount to about fifty percent of total compensatory awards. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995); Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 777 (stating that "[a]t present, pain-
and-suffering damages account for about half of the total tort damages paid in products liability
and medical malpractice cases").
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does the United States. 22 Most interesting, in my view, is the statutory
scheme recently adopted in New South Wales, Australia.2 3
Under the new law, injuries are to be ranked, percentage-wise, in
terms of their severity in comparison with the most extreme case.2 4
Hence one injury, say a leg amputation, might be rated as thirty-five
percent as severe as the most severe. In that case, a victim with this
injury would receive in pain and suffering thirty-five percent of the
sum that would be awarded to someone with the most severe injury.
Moreover, the new law sets the maximum award at 350,000 Australian
dollars (which is about $265,000 at current exchange rates), with that
sum to be indexed by inflation.2 5 Hence, an injury with a thirty-five
percent rating would, for now, qualify for an award of about $120,000
Australian (or $90,000).
It is additionally critical to note that, as shown in Table 17, under
the New South Wales scheme, for injuries that are thirty-three percent
less severe than the most extreme, the awards for pain and suffering
are not to be proportional to their severity. Instead, injuries rated as
less than fifteen percent as severe as the most severe are to receive
nothing for pain and suffering. And for injuries between fifteen per-
cent as severe and thirty-three percent as severe as the most severe,
the awards are increased to bridge the gap-two percent for an injury
that is seventeen percent as severe as the most severe, five percent for
one that is twenty-three percent, ten percent for one that is twenty-
seven percent, twenty-three percent for one that is thirty percent.
22. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (1970); JOHN G.
FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS (1967); ALLEN M. LINDEN, STUDIES IN
CANADIAN TORT LAW (1972).
23. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Tort Reform Through Damages Law Reform: An
American Perspective, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 507 (2005); Prue Vines, Faith, Hope, and Personal
Injury: The Ipp Report and the Civil Liability Acts, AUSTRALIAN CIV. LIABILITY 1 (2004). On
Australian damages law generally, see HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY AND DEATH (4th ed. 2002).
24. Civil Liability Act, 2002, c. 16 (N.S.W.).
25. Id.
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TABLE 17
NEW SOUTH WALES DISABILITY SEVERITY AND CORRESPONDING
PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARD
Severity
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
28%
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
34-100%
Damages
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
3%
3.5%
4%
4.5%
5%
5.5%
6.5%
8%
10%
14%
18%
23%
26%
30%
33%
34%-100%
respectively
Put differently, New South Wales has imposed a threshold on
awards for pain and suffering, requiring that an injury be at least fif-
teen percent as severe as the most severe for any award to be made,
and then it has graduated the amount of the award in a way so that
once the injury becomes thirty-three percent or more as severe as the
most severe injury, the percentages are in lock step with the award
linked to that made in the most serious case.
TABLE 18
"VERTICAL EQUITY": EUROPEAN-STUDY HYPOTHETICAL INJURIES
UNDER NEW SOUTH WALES LAW
Percentage of Maximum
Percentage Disability of the Award for P&S in
Most Severe New South Wales
Quadriplegia 100 100
Blindness 100 100
Deafness 50 50
Leg 35 35
Arm 30 23
Burns 20 3.5
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Table 18 illustrates how this new Australian law works by applying
the New South Wales approach to the six injuries discussed in the Eu-
ropean study, using the percentages of disability provided by McIn-
tosh and Holmes to their expert reporters, and assuming for these
purposes that quadriplegia is treated as the most severe injury. (In
some sense, this is clearly not the case, because one can imagine some-
one suffering a combination of quadriplegia and blindness, for exam-
ple; but this simplification is necessary for purposes of illustration.)
Looking at Table 18, note how the New South Wales scheme has an
especially sharp impact on the loss of a leg as compared with the loss
of an arm because those two disability percentages are stipulated as
falling slightly on either side of thirty-three percent. Looking back to
Table 2, no European nation's vertical equity percentages seem to pre-
cisely fit the assumed New South Wales pattern for loss of leg and loss
of arm. Nonetheless, it is perhaps worth noting that Austria, Liech-
tenstein, and Luxembourg all award pain and suffering for a loss of a
leg at least ten percentage points higher than loss of an arm. (Yet,
note also that Finland, Iceland, and Sweden rank arm loss at least nine
percentage points higher than leg loss.)
Table 18 makes vivid how the New South Wales scheme sharply
reduces the award for harms that are only twenty percent as severe as
the most severe. Hence, under this assumed application of the New
South Wales law to the six injuries, the pain and suffering award for
facial burns would be only 3.5% of that sum awarded for the most
severe injury. No European reporter predicted an award for burns
that is as low as 3.5% of the highest award for the reporter's nation.
Nonetheless, several did report awards for burns that were quite
low-seven percent of the highest in Sweden, eight percent in Italy
and France, and ten percent in Switzerland and Portugal. Hence, one
might well be seeing the rough equivalent of the New South Wales
approach in these places. If nothing else, there appears to be a sharp
discounting in these four nations for relatively lesser injuries.
It is also useful here to compare the Canadian approach. Some
years ago the Canadian Supreme Court set a ceiling on awards for
pain and suffering of 100,000 Canadian dollars, a sum that has grown
with inflation to about 300,000 dollars today (or about US $250,000).26
But this limit is not generally thought to work like caps do in the
United States. Although there is some disagreement among Canadian
courts, the dominant view appears to be that the maximum award is to
26. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 265. See generally D. GARD-
NER, L'EVALUATION DU PREJUDICE CORPOREL (2d ed. 2002).
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be made only for the most serious injuries and, that the awards for
other injuries should be scaled back from the maximum based on their
relative seriousness. 27
As noted earlier, caps in the United States seem intended only to
influence the actual judgments awarded to those who receive jury ver-
dicts above the maximum. Hence, one expects those victims with a
wide variety of injuries to wind up clustered at the maximum.28 By
contrast, if the Canadian and New South Wales approaches were em-
braced in the United States, the ceiling would as well be intended to
affect all of those plaintiffs whose jury verdicts are currently at or be-
low the cap.
Comparing the Canadian practice with the New South Wales law,
what appears quite special about the latter approach is the explicit
threshold of a seriousness requirement before any pain and suffering
award is to be made. With very little experience so far under the new
law, however, it is not altogether clear what sorts of harms are going
to be reliably excluded from pain and suffering recovery. To be sure,
neither Canada nor Australia makes much use of juries in personal
injury cases, 29 but as discussed later, this alone need not preclude
American states from seeking to adapt the regimes of the sort just
described.
Something very much like this "percentage of the most serious
harm" approach recently adopted in New South Wales is already rea-
sonably well developed in nations like Italy and France. There, inju-
ries are, in effect, assigned a percentage of disability based upon
expert medical determinations. 30 Once a victim's harm is assigned its
percentage point, this number is then put into a formula (or a table)
that determines the approximately appropriate sum to be awarded to
that victim for noneconomic loss.
As for the details, for Italy at least, as reported and endorsed by
Professor Giovanni Comande in an unpublished article on pain and
suffering, the formula (like the New South Wales table) is not simply
linear.31 Rather, Comande argued that courts both do and should in-
crease pain and suffering awards in more than a linear way as injury
27. See, e.g., White v. Gait, [2004] 224 D.L.R.4th 347; Hodgson v. Walsh, [1999] 121 O.A.C.
255.
28. For some empirical evidence of the role of caps in slicing off recoveries for those with the
most serious injuries, see David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of
Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54 (2004).
29. See generally FLEMING, supra note 4.
30. Comand6, supra note 13.
31. Id.
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severity increases. 32 This, broadly speaking, is what the New South
Wales law does for injuries with severity rankings between fifteen per-
cent and thirty-three percent, but not for those with rankings above
thirty-three percent-as is done in Italy.
Courts in England and Germany have adopted what at first blush
appears to be a different practice. In these legal systems very careful
records about past awards for specific types of injuries are kept and
publicly reported. 33 This reporting is done by private firms in Ger-
many and by a quasi-public body in England. Courts then are quite
faithful in following these past award sums from case to case (again,
increasing the awards over time for inflation).
But so long as the pattern of past awards reflects a sense of relative
seriousness of injuries, and so long as new types of injuries are
thoughtfully compensated with amounts for other injuries in mind,
this approach, in the end, seems little different than the "percent of
the most serious harm" approach used elsewhere. Put differently, in
England and Germany, the courts do not go through the intermediate
step of assigning a specific harm a percentage of disability and then
translating that percentage to a specific award. Yet, the British and
German approach implicitly has that same strategy in mind.
One advantage of the "percent of the most serious harm" approach
is that it is not necessary to keep track of inflationary adjustments for
every injury. Instead, it suffices simply to keep the percent disabled
ratings for each injury constant over time and then to increase the
highest award with inflation. Moreover, if a nation concludes that its
award schedule, in general, is lower than seems just, it can easily up-
wardly adjust all awards again simply by raising the ceiling. If such a
decision were made in England or Germany, it would require that all
the specific-injury reports be upwardly adjusted accordingly (which, in
the end, is not all that difficult to do).
VII. POLICY DISCUSSION
A. Caps Without Change in the Payment of Legal Expenses?
Some U.S. advocates have called for a legislative cap of $250,000 on
pain and suffering awards, and some states have already adopted a
limit of this sort (often somewhat higher and often applicable only to
medical malpractice cases). 34 As already explained, it is important to
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., ADAC, supra note 7.
34. See ATRA site, supra note 2. See also Stephen D. Sugarman, Op-Ed, The Legal Sting of
Pain and Suffering, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at M5 (stating that both President Bush and Senate
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appreciate that, in the American context, a cap is generally intended
only to affect awards that otherwise would be above the cap. That is,
juries are not told of the limit, but if they make awards above the cap,
their awards are simply reduced. Put differently, the financial burden
of caps in the United States is meant to be borne only by those with
the most serious injuries. The point of a ceiling elsewhere, however, is
to create a framework within which all injuries are scaled and victims
with similar injuries are awarded reasonably consistent sums from
case to case.
The materials presented here demonstrate that, so long as winners
in U.S. personal injury cases have to pay their own legal expenses, a
cap of $250,000 in pain and suffering will typically leave a large share
of U.S. victims with serious injuries considerably worse off than their
European counterparts.
TABLE 19
U.S. LEG AMPUTATION AWARDS ADJUSTING FOR LEGAL FEES AND
A CAP ON PAIN & SUFFERING OF $250,000 ($1000s)
With $250K
Inadjusted P&S Cap P&S left
P&S Total P&S Total (minus 33%) ($) P&S left (C)
150 500 150 500 (20) (15)
200 1,442 200 1442 (280) (210)
150 400 150 400 20 15
400 435 250 285 155 120
452 633 250 431 110 80
490 573 250 333 139 105
500 734 250 484 90 70
615 716 250 351 130 100
1,000 1,500 250 750 0 0
1,550 2,420 250 1120 (125) (95)
1,750 4,493 250 2993 (750) (560)
4,000 7,568 250 3818 (1020) (765)
5,580 6,343 250 1013 (90) (70)
5,600 7,670 250 2320 (525) (395)
6,000 7,497 250 1747 (330) (250)
7,500 7,510 250 260 165 125
9,750 11,426 250 1926 (392) (295)
Table 19 shows what are assumed would be the awards for U.S. leg
loss victims (drawn from Table 15) were pain and suffering amounts
simply capped at $250,000. First, note that, as a result of the cap, four-
Majority Leader Bill Frist advocate a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering awards in medical
malpractice claims).
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teen of the seventeen victims would have their awards reduced, and in
most cases by a dramatic amount.
Second, note that nine of the seventeen victims would find them-
selves with pain and suffering awards of less than thirty-three percent
of their total award, thereby requiring them to pay legal expenses par-
tially from their recovery for out-of-pocket losses. 35 All of these vic-
tims would, on my assumptions, clearly be worse off in terms of pain
and suffering recovery as compared with similar victims in all of the
European nations. Moreover, of those eight with some money left
over for pain and suffering after covering legal expenses, none would
net more than $160,000 or C120,000, and two of those eight would
wind up with nearly nothing for pain and suffering. This compares
with the median predicted European nation award of C41,000 for the
loss of a leg and the highest predicted European award of C166,000
for the loss of a leg (see Table 14). Hence, on balance, on my assump-
tions, a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering would leave the typical
American leg loss victim worse off than his or her European counter-
part in terms of net recovery for pain and suffering (after legal
expenses).
For the American quadriplegia victims we identified, were a
$250,000 cap on pain and suffering in place, then every one of them
would wind up having to use all of that award plus substantially more
to cover his or her legal expenses. Indeed, as shown in Table 20
(drawn from Table 16), every one of the twelve victims with
quadriplegia would have to use up all of the pain and suffering money
and then dip into economic loss recovery by a minimum of $800,000 to
pay the assumed legal expenses.
35. I put aside here the possibility that the jury would become aware of the cap and end run
its limit by increasing its award for out-of-pocket losses by the amount of pain and suffering
money it wishes to award above the cap. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Con-
sequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391 (2005).
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TABLE 20
U.S. QUADRIPLEGIA AWARDS ADJUSTING FOR LEGAL FEES AND A
CAP ON PAIN & SUFFERING OF $250,000 ($1000s)
Unadjusted
Total Award P&S left
P&S Share Total Award w/$250K Cap (minus 33% for legal fees)
1,000 3,950 3,200 (820)
1,500 19,100 17,850 (5700)
2,000 7,345 5,595 (1615)
2,500 7,872 5,622 (1624)
3,000 8,972 6,222 (1824)
3,400 6,670 3,520 (924)
3,500 8,187 4,937 (1395)
4,000 17,770 14,020 (4423)
4,600 21,360 17,010 (5420)
4,900 9,500 4,850 (1367)
6,000 9,000 3,250 (833)
6,000 16,530 10,780 (3343)
In short, U.S.-type caps of $250,000, when added to U.S. rules on
legal expenses, are extremely harsh on seriously injured victims.
Many American victims would find themselves far outside the range
of European awards on the low side. This is in dramatic contrast to
the way American victims are nominally treated by uncapped jury
awards for pain and suffering.
Suppose U.S. jurisdictions adopted a scale of awards for pain and
suffering like that of New South Wales, and set the highest award in
2005 at $500,000. Then, at today's currency conversion rates, nominal
U.S. pain and suffering awards would be moderately above the high
end of the awards made in Europe, Australia, and Canada, but they
would not be way off the charts-as our awards are today.
Nevertheless, under such a scheme, unless victim legal expenses
were also paid by defendants, many seriously impaired American vic-
tims would still likely wind up worse off than their counterparts in at
least many of the comparison nations.
B. A New Regime for Both Pain and Suffering and Legal Fees?
To bring the American law broadly into line with the high end (or
moderately above the high end) of the European and Commonwealth
nations discussed here, a two-pronged change would be needed. That
is, first, American states could adopt a ceiling approach of the sort
used elsewhere-perhaps that recently enacted in New South Wales.
As above, imagine for these purposes a ceiling of $500,000 (to be ad-
justed for inflation). Second, liable defendants would also be required
to pay the victim's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of litigation.
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Under such a regime, a critical issue would be the method for deter-
mining what constitutes reasonable fees. One could adopt European-
type approaches that envision payment based on the specific efforts
performed (sometimes also taking into account the time put into the
effort).36 This is sure to be highly unpopular with plaintiffs' lawyers in
the United States, many of whom detest the idea of keeping time
sheets to record the specifics of their effort on the case. They would
prefer to maintain a contingent fee percentage. If that mechanism
were employed, however, it is not evident that so-called "market"
rates now charged by lawyers would have to be embraced by statute.
For example, I have elsewhere proposed legal fees (paid by defend-
ants) equal to ten percent of what defendants offer within, say, ninety
days of the injury, and then forty percent of any amount eventually
won beyond the amount of the initial offer.37 This strategy is designed
to stimulate a reasonable early offer and, in turn, a quick settlement.
A different approach would be to adopt the fee schedule (or some-
thing like it) now contained in California's law governing medical mal-
practice cases.38 Plaintiffs' lawyers may charge no more than:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars
($500,000) recovered.
(4) Fifteen percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds
six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000). 39
While I have not been able to gain any hard data on the level of
legal fees in Europe as compared with tort recoveries, contacts of
mine have informally reported that, in the end, lawyers in many coun-
tries wind up with legal fees of approximately ten percent of the tort
award, regardless of the formal mechanism used to determine those
fees. Compared with that, the California medical malpractice sched-
ule is generous.
Just to illustrate how a new regime of the sort proposed here might
work, Table 21 provides some examples drawn from the leg-loss and
quadriplegia numbers used here (with a bit of rounding to make the
presentation easier to follow). For simplicity, the table assumes that
36. For a discussion of legal fees in a variety of nations, see William B. Fisch, Professional
Services, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 78-86 (1999). See also
FLEMING, supra note 4.
37. Sugarman, supra note 23.
38. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (a) (West 2003).
39. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the maximum pain and suffering award would be paid to the
quadriplegia victim ($500,000) and forty percent of that sum to the leg
loss victim ($200,000). The table also assumes that defendants would
pay victim legal fees according to the schedule of maximum legal fees
applicable to California malpractice cases, as noted above.
TABLE 21
EXAMPLES COMPARING THE EXISTING REGIME WITH
A PROPOSED NEW REGIME ($1000S)
Existing Regime Proposed New Regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Paid Legal Net P&S Net Total Total To Legal Total Paid
P&S by Defendant Fees to Victim to Victim P&S Victim Fees by Defendant
Leg 500 750 (250) 250 500 200 450 125 575
Leg 1000 1500 (500) 500 1000 200 700 177 877
Quad 1000 4500 (1500) (500) 3000 500 4000 672 4672
Ouad 3000 9000 (3000) 0 6000 500 6500 1047 7547
Quad 6000 9000 (3000) 3000 6000 500 3500 597 4097
Quad 4000 15000 (5000) (1000) 10000 500 11500 1797 13297
The examples set out in Table 21 show that under the proposed re-
gime as compared with the common-law regime: (1) some victims
would net more and others less (compare columns five and seven); (2)
plaintiff lawyers would earn less (compare columns three and eight);
(3) and defendants would generally pay less overall (compare columns
two and nine). Put differently, from the victim's viewpoint, the reduc-
tion in the pain and suffering award (column one minus column six) is
sometimes greater than and sometimes less than the saved legal fees
(column three). And from the defendant's viewpoint, the reduction in
pain and suffering obligation (column one minus column six) is usu-
ally greater than the new obligation to pay legal fees (column eight).
Not illustrated by this table is the envisioned impact on those with
smaller injuries. In those cases, the predicted recovery for pain and
suffering would generally be both less in amount (indeed zero in the
least severe cases) and more consistent from case to case. Net recov-
ery to victims and total cost to injurers would vary from the current
regime based on the same factors already noted.
C. Values and Politics
In the end, I personally favor a reform of the American law of tort
damages of the sort discussed here: (1) liable defendants would be
obligated to pay the victims' reasonable legal expenses, just as they
are obligated to pay victims' reasonable medical expenses; and (2)
pain and suffering awards would be modeled after the New South
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Wales approach, but with an initial ceiling of, say, $500,000 (instead of
$350,000 Australian). 40
The New South Wales approach could be implemented in our jury-
based system by (1) instructing juries to determine the percent this
victim's harm is as compared with the most serious harm, (2) allowing
both sides to introduce evidence as to how past juries have rated
roughly similar harm, and (3) instructing juries to award the amount
of pain and suffering damages as the legislative-administrative table
calls for when the percent of the most serious harm is as they have
found it to be in the case.
Yet, perhaps people in the United States would not want the reform
favored here, or perhaps this reform could not be politically achieved
even if favored by the majority. First, Americans may actually prefer
nominally to award huge sums for pain and suffering, a substantial
share of which goes to plaintiffs' lawyers. Americans may like the
current practice because, being a very wealthy nation, we may believe
that victims of wrongdoing are entitled to enormous awards by world-
wide standards-awards that we, as consumers, may be quite willing
to pay for in the cost of our goods and services. Or perhaps because
we are so rich, and so value money in our culture, we wish to assign
extremely large money values to diminished life experiences when we
think those worsened experiences are undeserved. Or maybe it is that
we so value what personal injury lawyers do for us as consumers that
we are more than happy to have them take a large bite from what are
gigantic awards by worldwide standards.
Moreover, although many Americans might in some respects disap-
prove of unequal treatment of similar victims, we as a society may be
unwilling to do anything to reduce our disparities because of our cul-
tural commitment to individual juries doing what they see as individ-
ual justice to individual victims personally before them in the
courtroom.
Furthermore, even if most Americans agreed that our pain and suf-
fering awards are nominally too large, too unevenly awarded, and
wrongly used to pay legal fees assessed against a victim's total recov-
ery, legislatively enacting the sorts of reforms suggested here will be
extremely difficult.
Not only is the personal injury bar politically very strong, but also it
may well take some doing to convince ordinary people that reforms
40. I would most prefer to join these with other reforms in the law of damages that I do not
address here. See Sugarman, supra note 23. See also STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY
WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISM FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS,
AND BUSINESS (1989).
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that lower the overall cost of tort liability to defendants are actually
translated into reduced costs of goods, services, insurance, and the like
for society in general. In sum, as strange as what we now have seems
to me, it may well be what most of my fellow Americans (on balance)
want.
After all, pain and suffering damages are what drive our tort "lot-
tery," and a large share of Americans seems to enjoy playing "lottery"
games, notwithstanding their bad odds. Perhaps, therefore, a first step
in selling my proposed reforms to the public would be to include a
promise that, along with their monetary awards for pain and suffering
in a U.S. version of the New South Wales plan, successful tort victims
would also be given a number of actual lottery tickets in their state's
lottery (or the equivalent).
